I'm glad someone understands

And one consequence of this, we argue, is that the hollowed-out parties in the global north hemorrhaging voters to far right authoritarians might learn something from parties of the global south that have never taken the stability of their democratic systems for granted.

There are still lots of dangers here, and in the paper we place additional conditions on leaders' behavior to ensure they actually serve democratic ends. Still, when conditions are dire, and countervailing power is in short supply, we should broaden the range of tactics we consider

Another case is when authoritarian incumbents control the media system in which programmatic appeals are made. Here too, clientelism may be permissible to get a foothold in an inhospitable environment. The key is shifting terms of competition towards distributive issues, then scaling up who benefits

One case is when clientelism is culturally embedded, meaning parties that don't play the patronage / distribution game can't gain a foothold. We argue democracy-seeking parties can permissibly play the game to get traction, as long as they transition voters gradually towards a programmatic vision

These can, in theory, be provided by "programmatic" parties and other non-particularistic organizations - classically, labor unions. But sometimes there are serious obstacles to building countervailing power through these means. And in those cases, machine politics may be a permissible alternative.

As Udit and I have both argued elsewhere, what's needed is more countervailing power. And building on waves of recent scholarship, we argue that two things are key to generating it: socially and structurally dense networks, and collective identities grounded in material interests.

For democracy to function well, there must be some balance in the collective power exercised different groups. Huge imbalances in this respect are a key reason for the democratic deficits we observe today: some groups have enormous background advantages and therefore dominate the political system.

This claim builds on the sizable subgenre of scholarship on clientelism, often based on ethnographic fieldwork, which observes that certain collective practices seem to have redeeming democratic qualities. We formalize that intuition and scrutinize it using the tools of normative democratic theory.

In a word: yes, they do. We accept the consensus that particularistic exchanges violate democratic ideals and may initiate dangerous dynamics. Yet in certain non-ideal contexts, limited engagement in "collective" forms of clientelism may be the best way for parties to pursue democratic ends.

The deadline for best consideration is October 14 (next Wednesday), though applications will continue to be accepted after that.

Finally, it's worth saying that The USC Political Science Department is a great place to work! Collegial, growing, and theory-friendly, with excellent leadership. Come join us!

We believe a wide range of exciting projects in political theory fit this general description, and encourage anyone with genuine interests in related areas to apply, as long as they can make a persuasive case for meeting these criteria.

The job description calls for "scholars of civil society and public discourse in the American tradition, whose research considers the norms, practices, and institutions that sustain a flourishing and pluralistic civil society; as well as the responsibilities of citizens within it."

Second, the CACLPD at USC has a similar substantive focus as other recently founded civic centers, but unlike many others (e.g., UNC, Florida, Ohio State), all faculty will be hired into existing departments, become full members of those departments, and be held to their standards for tenure, etc...

The call went up on APSA eJobs last week, so I suspect most folks on the theory market will have already seen it, but I thought it was worth sharing a few extra details here. First off, I am on the search committee for this position, and am happy to answer questions (as far as I am able).