Stefanie Walter

@stefwalter.bsky.social

International relations and IPE prof at the University of Zurich and Co-Director of the UZH Crisis Competence Center. Research on globalization backlash, IPE, international (non-)cooperation, and IOs. Optimist expecting the worst.

@stefwalter.bsky.social

Promising avenues going forward: ✴️ Theory development on when drivers generate internal criticism/external rejection and movement between both. 💽 Data on informal and obstructionist forms of contestation. ⁉️ Implications for organizational robustness, hegemonic contestation & broader contestation.

@stefwalter.bsky.social

We also discuss how IOs as strategic actors react to contestation through communicative action, institutional reform, and policy change. We identify a need for more research on how effective IOs’ responses are in countering contestation and shoring up support.

@stefwalter.bsky.social

A key task moving forward is theorizing the conditions under which these factors give rise to one form of contestation rather than another—and under which one form of contestation morphs into another.

@stefwalter.bsky.social

We highlight three processes that drive IO contestation: expanded international authority and deepened value conflicts; global power shifts and a resurgence of autocracy; and societal transformations and rising anti-globalist populist pressure.

@stefwalter.bsky.social

Contestation varies considerably across IOs and over time. In contrast to much punditry and scholarly discourse, however, it does not appear to have increased over the past 20 years. We discuss potential explanations – studying this in more detail will be an exciting avenue for future research.

@stefwalter.bsky.social

We define contestation as any action or inaction that challenges an IO or its policies with the intention to improve, replace, or nullify existing arrangements. There are different types of contestation, depending on who contests and the substance of the criticism.

@stefwalter.bsky.social

Interested in doing policy-relevant and transdisciplinary research on the geopolitical challenges facing Swiss businesses, supply chains and the economy? Then consider submitting a proposal to the @snsf.ch NFP 87 "Deglobalisation and Resilience"

@cepr.orgReposted by @stefwalter.bsky.social

@jafrieden.bsky.social & @stefwalter.bsky.social argue that Europe's problem is political: there is no consensus among member states about how far and how fast to integrate. Rather than waiting, Europe should move in coalitions in areas of high payoff and high political friction.
ow.ly/iECq50ZQ5OU

The EU was built for a rules-based, Western-led international order that now looks like a relic. Writing for CEPR's Europe 2050 series, Jeffry Frieden (Columbia) and Stefanie Walter (University of Zurich and Bruegel) argue that Europe's problem in confronting an adversarial United States, an assertive China and a hostile Russia is not primarily economic but political: there is no consensus among member states, or within them, about how far and how fast to integrate. Drawing on survey data spanning the Eurozone crisis and party positions across the EU27, they show that political feasibility varies enormously by issue, from near-unanimous support for expanding the ESM to near-universal rejection of Commission pre-approval of national budgets, and that this feasibility rarely lines up with where the economic payoff from integration is largest. Their answer is differentiated integration: rather than waiting for unanimity, Europe should let coalitions of the willing move first in areas of high payoff and high political friction, such as a European safe asset or joint defence of the eastern border, while leaving areas like welfare or education policy at the national level and treating others, from grid integration to joint procurement, as low-hanging fruit. They point to Schengen's evolution from five founding members to near-universal EU membership as the template: a successful club creates its own momentum, making it increasingly costly for holdouts to stay outside. Beyond institutional design, they argue Europe's leaders need three habits it currently lacks: crafting reforms with built-in flexibility and lock-in effects rather than one-size-fits-all treaties, being honest with voters about the genuine trade-offs of compromises rather than pretending them away, and communicating in language citizens can actually parse, given that Commission press releases are, on average, harder to read than academic journal abstracts.
@stefwalter.bsky.social

4/5 Political divisions within member states also matter. Euroskepticism is real, but overall, there is substantial support for the EU both among the European public and elites. Mobilize that support! Be honest about costs and trade-offs, but also make Europe’s achievements visible.

@stefwalter.bsky.social

3/3 When agreement is hard, coalitions of willing can lead, if cooperation is possible without everyone on board. Even when EU-wide participation is ultimately needed, starting smaller may help demonstrate benefits and attract others to join later. Smart reform design can help build support.

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