@gas-station-susie.bsky.socialIn The Unknown Enemy, military surprise starts with a Theory of Mind error: misreading how an adversary will behave. The blunder is often systematic, not random—so it can be avoided, or quietly encouraged across the lines.
@gas-station-susie.bsky.socialThe Unknown Enemy shows how stereotypical bias can become a military readiness risk when AI inherits it from human data—or when adversaries cultivate it in enemy systems. Prejudice, it turns out, is lousy code.
@gas-station-susie.bsky.socialIn The Unknown Enemy, Pearl Harbor commander Walter Short is warned of sabotage and surprise attack—then receives follow-up orders fixated on sabotage. One risk balloons; the lethal one is sidelined. A muddled warning is no defence plan.
@gas-station-susie.bsky.socialIn The Unknown Enemy, motivated reasoning does more than cherry-pick facts: it cherry-picks the rules used to judge them, all while preserving an illusion of objectivity. Bias, it seems, can wear a tie.
@gas-station-susie.bsky.socialThe Unknown Enemy argues that Western leaders should have given more weight to Karzai’s read of Taliban behaviour than to their own projections. Local insight was available; confidence elbowed it aside.
@gas-station-susie.bsky.socialThe Unknown Enemy argues that commanders often mistake their own mindset for the enemy’s. On D-Day, German leaders projected their taste for boldness onto Allied planners and misread Normandy. The mirror makes a lousy intelligence officer.
@gas-station-susie.bsky.socialThe Unknown Enemy shows how rising enemy activity before Tet was made to fit an optimistic US view: evidence of strength became proof of weakness. A neat bit of reasoning—right up until reality objected.
@gas-station-susie.bsky.socialIn The Unknown Enemy, Russia’s Siverskyi Donets crossing illustrates plan continuation bias: Ukrainian artillery made the plan unfeasible, yet Russian forces tried nine times. Persistence is a poor substitute for updated assumptions.
@gas-station-susie.bsky.socialIn The Unknown Enemy, plan continuation bias isn’t simply taking a risk; it’s clinging to a plan after a required safety limit has been breached. Persistence has its virtues. Ignoring the instruments isn’t one of them.
@gas-station-susie.bsky.socialThe Unknown Enemy shows why hoping an adversary will choose the course you fear least is wishful thinking in uniform—and why the enemy’s idea of the worst blow may not match your own.
@gas-station-susie.bsky.socialThe Unknown Enemy shows how Napoleon’s confidence became a planning trap: he expected Alexander to follow his script, ignored contingencies, and mistook determination for control. The enemy, inconveniently, gets a vote.
@gas-station-susie.bsky.socialThe Unknown Enemy shows how military minds can misread an adversary without ever deciding they’re alike. Theory of mind quietly uses the self as its model. Handy shortcut; lousy intelligence.
@gas-station-susie.bsky.socialThe Unknown Enemy shows why familiarity is no cure for misreading an opponent: we use ourselves as the model, project our own caution or goodwill, and call the result insight. Sometimes it’s just a mirror in uniform.
#MilitaryPsychology #TheoryOfMind
@gas-station-susie.bsky.socialIn The Unknown Enemy, motivated reasoning does more than cherry-pick facts: it cherry-picks the rules used to judge them, all while preserving an illusion of objectivity. Bias, it seems, can wear a tie.
#MilitaryPsychology #TheoryOfMind
@gas-station-susie.bsky.socialThe Unknown Enemy argues that Western leaders should have given more weight to Karzai’s read of Taliban behaviour than to their own projections. Local insight was available; confidence elbowed it aside.
#MilitaryPsychology #TheoryOfMind
@gas-station-susie.bsky.socialThe Unknown Enemy shows how rising enemy activity before Tet was made to fit an optimistic US view: evidence of strength became proof of weakness. A neat bit of reasoning—right up until reality objected.
#MilitaryPsychology #TheoryOfMind
@gas-station-susie.bsky.socialIn The Unknown Enemy, Russia’s Siverskyi Donets crossing illustrates plan continuation bias: Ukrainian artillery made the plan unfeasible, yet Russian forces tried nine times. Persistence is a poor substitute for updated assumptions.
#MilitaryPsychology #TheoryOfMind