The overall picture that emerges is a history-sensitive compatibilist view on which morally responsible agency requires a form of alternative self-expression and ownership.

In my commentary on Vargas’s view, I suggest that if the stakes are too high for the imposition of certain kinds of moral treatment for libertarians then the stakes may well also be too high for such practices to be justified on Vargas’s revisionist model.

Re Pereboom’s chapter, I offer a new reply on behalf of soft-line compatibilism. I argue that acknowledging certain sufficient conditions for mitigating responsibility doesn’t support, in itself, the step to incompatibilist conclusions about the 4-Case Argument (and other manipulation arguments).

I worry, however, using perspectival variants of Frankfurt-style cases, that Fischer’s attitudinal ownership conditions for moral responsibility are dependent on a belief about the obtaining of leeway control.

In response to Fischer’s chapter, I argue in support of his compatibilist sourcehood as a kind of self-expression and ownership.

However, I argue that Kane’s weakening of the dual effort condition does not handle luck and branching worries and may erase some of the merits of his earlier view.

The authors of the second edition of Four Views of Free Will (2024) have skillfully captured what is at stake, metaphysically and socially, in the free will and moral responsibility debates. In my commentary on Kane’s libertarian view, I note the merits of a sourcehood freedom that requires leeway.