The Kremlin wanted veterans’ victories to project unity behind the war. The election results suggest war is far from popular. New mobilisation will need more coercion, even without mass protests. West should factor in these costs, but can't count on them to prevent escalation 4/4

Some other KPRF candidates offer further signs of a veteran penalty. Most of their veterans running in single-member constituencies polled below KPRF’s list there. Their shortfall averaged 3-5 pp more than for non-veterans, both in official results and within “clean” precincts 3/

Komi Republic is a telling case: a war veteran was fielded to defeat a popular KPRF MP who even called for peace in campaign. “Clean” precinct coverage fell from 94% to 61% in 2021-26. The decline was nationwide, but averaged 6 pp more in districts with veterans than elsewhere 2/

But new Duma will mix real combatant with established politicians claiming veterans credentials. This is not a bug, it's a feature of the system. Embedding newcomers among experienced politicians should help Kremlin keep any veterans’ grouping dependent and limit its autonomy 11/

Elections are another route into the pool, most widely used at regional and municipal levels in 2024-2025. I project around 50 veterans in the next State Duma, far fewer than the Kremlin promissed a year ago. They would hold roughly 10% of seats. 10/

But in the mean time regional governors more often create for veterans new, didn't exist before posts. 44% of all 400+ documented appointments involve working with veterans and their families, and 30% ideological work. Only 22% involve general management. 8/

Veterans seem to be replacing technocrats as Putin’s preferred recruitment pool. I compared their training programmes: the shift is from “make competent people loyal” to “make loyal people competent”. Skills and practical work take up 68% of training, against 34%. 6/

By now veterans hold posts in the consituences from Roscosmos to the Central Election Commission. This breadth suggests a reserve for future vacancies: Putin can draw on people whose loyalty is tied to the war and who have begun gaining experience in the relevant institution. 5/

Veteran appointments are often assumed to be largely confined to ideological work or veteran support. Yet half of federal programme appointments involve real responsibility for managing organisations or sectors, often with little relevant prior training. 4/

The Kremlin’s repeated claims of many appointments for TH participants are borne out by the data: 110+ by September 2026. Since 2024, some have already had 2 or 3 appointments, advancing faster than other bureaucrats. For 10-12, a State Duma seat could also be the next step. 3/

The federal Time of Heroes programme is the main route into this pool. 84% of TH participants have exclusively military backgrounds. None has reached top national office; most senior posts went to the few with prior political careers. But itlooks like just the beginning of story.