Are the predictors of populist attitudes the same across age groups? Stockemer & Bordeleau find that distrust in government is an essential predictor for older people, but not the youth. For the youth, radical political participation is a strong predictor, but not for the elders.

Political socialization attributes youth activism & participation to familial & peer socialization. Yet Osorio et al. find that first-gen & college students of color can share election information back home. This knowledge can increase voter turnout in low-propensity communities.

Knuckey extends Sommer & Franco's (2024) findings that racially resentful black people were more likely to support Trump in 2020. Using the CES to examine vote choice in 2024, Knuckey finds that Sommer & Franco captured a different construct: black resentment towards whites.

Colbern et al. ask: How can, and why should, scholarship on immigrant policy more explicitly prioritize the dignity & rights of immigrants? They argue for Civically Engaged Research as an intervention and urge scholars to align theory with practice in immigration federalism.

Do LGBT Christians correspond with political cross-pressures (ambivalence, moderation, & disengagement)? Strode & Tenenbaum find that while LGBT Christians are more cross-pressured than non-religious LGBT people, cis-hetero Christians are more cross-pressured than other groups.

Haenschen and Smith explore how ideological framing of the 2020 BLM protests shape attitudes towards the movement. With a two-wave survey experiment (n=894), they find that exposure to the liberal frame increases favorability ratings compared to the conservative frame.

Klofstad et al. explore belief in the "white replacement" theory. They find that 1/3 of Americans embrace the theory and that it is associated with anti-social personality traits, nationalist/authoritarian sentiment, and negative attitudes towards minorities and the establishment