Wenn deutsche SiPo in vergangenen Jahren eines gelernt haben sollte, dann, dass das "Sparen" an grundsaetzlichen Eckdaten ein sensationelles Eigentor darstellt, das mittelfristig erneut in Faehigkeitsluecken und langfristig in entsprechenden neuen u Extra-Kosten resultiert. /end

Der zweite Aspekt ist Kostenkontrolle. Niemand ist damit gedient, wenn urspruenglich zitierte Kosten, inkl angeblicher Einsparungen, langfristig illusionaer bleiben. Die Auftragsstruktur muss sicherstellen, dass KPIs erreichbar & Ansprueche bei Fehlleistungen durchsetzbar sind.

Echte Einsparungen ergeben sich schlicht aus einem "schlankeren" Anforderungsprofil. Das wuerde zb bedeuten, man reduziert den Anteil an nationalen Sonderwuenschen, sei es das CMS oder verschiedene "Goldrandloesung"-Komponenten fuer EW, ASW u Nahbereichsverteidigung.

The kanji is 翔鯨, and the equivalent is Shōgei. I would pronounce it Shogei rather than Shougei, but YMMV and I am not proficient in Japanese.

End of the day this is primarily another example of how governments and services ideally get much better explaining operational rationales to the public. But from an institutional POV this remains a low priority, not just in NZ. Institutions rather just get on with it & ignore public talking points.

Indias largest AOR to date remains JNS Jyoti, at ca 36,000 tons, which incidentally is a sistership to the Chinese Type 908 AOR Qinghaihu (885). Both were originally Soviet Komandarm Fedko-class replenishment oilers transferred during the 1990s.

What did change in spaces like the SCS & generally the "first island chain" is not the emergence of particular new technologies. But the rise of a navy that uses new & "older" technologies to project power. The nature of sea control in the Pacific changes because of PLAN. /end

In the littoral space on the other hand sea control has arguably never been persistent, because innovations such as mines, submarines, AShM etc always put challengers at an advantage, resulting in intermediate sea control where such assets are a threat for decades.

This dynamic IMO is not driven by any technological change, drones or otherwise, but by power balances. Consider that the US maintained this type of sea control only from the second half of the Pacific War, and then, absent any serious naval challenge, into the present time.

My principal concern is that "sea control" to a large extent in Western thinking is shaped by long-standing stable power ratios ensuring what the text calls "classic sea control - exerted by a largely unchallenged navy for long durations and over wide areas".

Secondly, does that have to be 06FFM? Range, capability & interoperability appeal. Politics do, too. Price & complexity less so. There are other options for real frigates, but end of the day none of them will be a lot cheaper IMO, especially over the long term, so the problem remains the same. /end

There are two questions. First, whether NZ needs a frigate? I think they do, based on general requirements and the historical track record shaping procurement decisions. Efforts to get frigates on the cheap (such as FFBNW and OPV sold as FFs) never pan out. You do get what you pay for.

Thanks!

Am Ende muss man natuerlich beides machen, ie "schnell = FMS", "nachhaltig = national/Euro". Das kann uebrigens auch Lizensproduktion von US-Systemen sein, haben wir bei CH-53 damals nicht anders gemacht. Bzgl F-35 Preis bin ich unsicher, ob da das Triebwerk inbegriffen war.