Then just two weeks ago, Meta released their H2 Adversarial Threat Report, which included disrupting an IO firm from Israel running the *same exact campaigns* that BlackCore was exposed for, including in Angola. Meta doesn't name the firm - but how likely is it to be a pure coincidence?

But you may be surprised by the engagement levels they were proud to show their clients. Almost 20k reactions, 230 comments, and 90 shares for a single BlackCore's linked Facebook post. And: 630K views, 90% of which by non-followers of the page! The red markings are theirs.

You probably won't be shocked to hear that one of BlackCore's main avatars in Angola, "Gancho Atalaia", was an AI-generated middle-aged man depicted while pensively reading a tome on "ciência política". Nor that "Dorivaldo Kiala" was not a real Angolan political activist.

But what was even more revealing was their final report to the client. In it, BlackCore claimed to have run a continuative 14-week program including the deployment of live assets on the target platforms. It showed examples. And it boasted of its successes.

Their proposal was pretty specific and, at times, even technical. It even included modules on how to run advertisement campaigns linked to the covert IO on both Meta's platforms and TikTok.

But one more thing particularly stood out. BlackCore offered training programs for clients to run their own local campaigns independently. A source gave us access to documentation from one of them: a training program and its related operations supporting the government of Angola domestically.

On a subdomain of their website, BlackCore explicitly advertised *deception* as a service. Dominating the discourse w/avatars? ✅ Getting real people to engage with fakes? ✅ Disrupting dissenting, legitimate narratives? ✅ Are 100K to 1M monthly messages enough? ✅ Oh, and influencer partnerships.

BlackCore positioned itself as an expert actor in the covert influence operations industry. "Influencing perceptions" on behalf of clients is one of their stated goals. But before you're tempted to ask - isn't that what strategic political communications does? Let's move on to their next website.

We set out to analyze BlackCore's online presence and digital infrastructure, so to understand more about their modus operandi. The amount of publicly available information on their tactics was staggering, and it gave us an unprecedented view on how private covert IO firms truly operate.

BlackCore has been exposed before. Notably, in June this year the French government - via their counter-influence operations agency Viginum - accused the Israeli firm of being behind interference in elections in Scotland, New York City, a few African countries, and of course France.

1/ Citizen Lab researchers @noura.bsky.social, Shaila Baran, @mmichae1sen.bsky.social and @sanstis.bsky.social analyze how intersecting identities of gender and sexual orientation shape experiences of digital transnational repression in a special issue of the Journal of Online Trust and Safety.

As I mention in my comment to this investigation by @jdowsea.bsky.social and @occrp.org, coordinated false reporting is an almost invisible, and therefore incredibly underestimated censorship threat to civil society - and to anyone bothering those who will pay for the service.