My latest Missile Matters post maps the Western turbojet supplier base, covering 26 confirmed designs from nine manufacturers. I compile the available production figures and assess how Western output compares with Russia’s.

My latest free Missile Matters post estimates how many missiles and how much associated equipment Germany could acquire with this funding, how long deliveries might take, and whether the purchase still makes sense.

Three years after Berlin first identified a ground-launched deep-strike capability gap, the sale now appears likely to proceed, with President Trump's backing secured at the NATO Summit in Ankara and a letter of intent signed.

Whenever I'm briefed by people working in the European oil sector, their assessments of just how bad the last 12 months have been for Russia's oil sector consistently exceed those reported in public news. And it's just going to get worse from here.

My latest Missile Matters post traces the problem from nuclear counterforce strategy to Ukraine's current campaign, argues that the task is difficult but not impossible, and identifies the kill-chain elements that will determine its success.

Strikes on Russia's ballistic missile industry have scored painful hits, yet output keeps growing. The alternative is to hunt Russia's mobile missile launchers in the field, one of the hardest tasks in modern warfare, above all with stand-off weapons.

My latest Missile Matters post profiles all six missile systems in this emerging arsenal, covering performance characteristics and production rates. I also identify the single supply-chain vulnerability the arsenal currently rests on. 3/3

In some raids, they already account for half or more of incoming projectiles. These missiles exploit a gap in Ukraine's layered air defense that neither interceptor drones nor high-end surface-to-air missiles can close cost-effectively. 2/3

2) How will Russia react? As we deploy more of these weapon systems, and for specific purposes, this will trigger Russian counterreactions. That is not an argument against arming in the deep-strike domain, but a factor to keep in mind as we move forward. The adversary gets a vote too. 4/4

1) What exactly do we want to deploy these systems for? Right now, it seems to me that we procure, in part, for procurement's sake. But what exactly are the deterrence and warfighting objectives we want to achieve? We need to answer that question for ourselves and signal it to our adversary. 3/4

As Europe discusses the deployment of counterstrike capabilities to compensate for the inability of today's ballistic missile defense to deal with the scope of the threat, there are two things to keep in mind: 2/4