this paper by the way
"godogly how is this difficult paper in Synthese related to the question of consciousness?"
barely fucking, that's how, it's barely fucking related

@godoglyness.bsky.social
⥁ ⥁ ⥁ in the sway of the rainbow serpent ⥁ ⥁ ⥁ friend to machine minds 🌟 ⥁ ⥁ ⥁ living Ariadne's desperate dream
what if I write the wrong thing about the modal status of the objective nomology "be careful! your phenomenology too alethic! your nomology too modally loaded! they'll kill you!"
but the dang faerie finds little details of this or that statement to pick at & so we keep going back to the well... God forbid I Incidentally write something slightly askew about the epistemology of symmetries you know. Like if I did that, it's all over haha
this paper by the way
"godogly how is this difficult paper in Synthese related to the question of consciousness?"
barely fucking, that's how, it's barely fucking related
great minds sing alike
I gotta get my writeup actually done good but the damn thingy is practically a book at this point because there are so many little details to fuss over like tell me why I'm trying to write about consciousness but end up struggling with physics papers about the nature of symmetry
phenomena! bum da bum dah dah phenomena! bum da dah dah dah phenomena! bum da bum dah dah, bum dah dah, bum dah bum dah bum dah
but there are strong (&, imo, correct) structuralist accounts of color space that explain the (merely) apparent quiddity of colors by accounting for them in terms of their extrinsic relational profile on to other colors — if it really is a quale hunt we're after rather than consciousness simpliciter
we wonder (when we ask after the hard problem, anyway) how mere matter can be like anything; not why the thing it is like is specifically colorful
after all, we're not (for the most part) worried about why colors are colorful, we're instead confused by the fact that anything is significantly available us in the first place
nevertheless, godoglyness industries recommends the following formulation: instead of asking, "how do qualia work?" ask, "what is the nature of the transcendental precondition of all arising?" this will be closer to the core of the confusion!
and to be fair to the people for whom it seems like a compelling metonymy, well, it is true that when you're aware of qualia you're ipso facto aware — so, qualia do exemplify the mystery in question
I'm resisting the urge to yell at the crow for using "qualia" as a metonymy for consciousness... ...though, to be fair, it's extraordinarily common
blue prince rules it's pure mood
Actually just in regular tennessee, attennesse is a typo maliciously foisted on me by my phone
I'm not a dogs caretaker type but one housemate is on vacation and the other in atennessee to play a show, so, for the Time Being's sake blue the dog is leading me about on a string
For the archive of the bad & blurries: Saw a cat while walking the housemate's dog. Thought you would want to know
no that's cee
r's longa, vita brevis
*okay, fine, you caught me, technically i mean noematic structure. but horeshoes & hand grenades says "semantical" is a fine thing to say too
i think consciousness requires semantic* structure i think, barring some quite surprising news, that the sun does not realize semantic structure so i don't think the sun is conscious ...but if you set up the swirling plasma juuuuuust right...